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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiffRespondent,
Case No, 11540

vs.
FARHAD SOROUSHIRN,
DefendantAppellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance to
wit: Marijuana and convicted by a jury, the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde presiding.
Prom the conviction,he appeals.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Appellant was charged by complaint with the misdemeanor of Possession
of a Controlled Substance in violation of Section 58-37-8(2) (a) (i), Utah Code
Annotated (1953) as amended. The case was tried to a jury with the Honorable
Ronald O. Hyde, Judge, Second Judicial District for Weber County, presiding.
The Appellant was found guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substance and fined
$100. 00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction and/or a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning hours of July 3, 1977, Mr. Djafar Tawakoli, a Persian
student at Weber State College, made preparation to terminate his tenancy of room
-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

119, Warren Apartments, in Ogden City, Utah. He took his friend, defendant
Farhad Soroushirn, to the manager's officer to introduce him and to tell the
manager that Mr. Soroushirn would come by later to pick up his belongings and
turn in Mr. Tawakoli's key to the apartment.

The office was closed,

(Tr 99)

Without further delay Mr. Soroushirn, together with Hatsan Rafetti,
transported Mr. Tawakoli to the Salt Lake City Airport.

Prior to boarding his

10:30 a.m. flight to Persia, Mr. Tawakoli gave Mr. Soroushirn the key to his
apartment and asked him to remove his belongings from room 119 and to put
the same into storage until his return.

(Tr 98)

Sometime after 9:00 a.m. on the same morning, a cleaning lady, thinking
the apartment was empty, and by means of a master key (Tr 38) entered Mr.
Tawakoli1 s room at the Warren Apartments. She observed that the room had not
been vacated and that a TV set, luggage, and other personal effects remained.
(Tr 33) The matter was referred to the apartment managers who later on in the
day decided to make an "inventory" of what items were in the apartment. (Tr 34)
The cleaning lady and one of the managers returned to the apartment and
began an inventory of all items in the apartment. While searching the apartment,
they encountered a small plastic baggie in a cupboard drawer. (Tr 40) Becoming
suspicious of its contents, they called two police officers, living in room 128 of
the apartments, for advice. (Tr 36)
Ogden City Police Officer Joseph William OfKeefe J r . and Ogden Reserve
Officer James Robert McKinley responded to their call. (Tr 42, 43) Officer
O'Keefe opened the baggie and decided it was marijuana.

The officer and the

apartment manager proceeded to search the boxes and personal effects remaining
in the apartment. (Tr 44) In a small box in another closet, they located a second
plastic baggie containing what they believed to be marijuana. (Tr 45)
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Officer OfKeefe returned to his apartment to call the "Narcotics Squad".
(Tr 45) Officer McKinley was left in charge of the apartment. After waiting
about five minutes, he placed the two baggies on the counter, locked the door to
the apartment, and drove his wife to her mother f s house. (Tr 66, 67)
After Mr. Tawakoli f s departure for Persia, Messrs. Soroushirn and
Rafetti visited a friend in Salt Lake City for several hours. At about 3:30 p . m .
they returned to Ogden and proceeded to Mr. Tawakoli f s apartment to gather his
belongings and put them into storage as per his request. (Tr 116) Using the key
provided them and being unaware of any of the prior happenings in the apartment,
they began removing boxes and suitcases from the apartment and placing them in
Mr. RafettiTs automobile.
They were observed by Officer 0 ? Keefe and by one of the apartment managers.
Officer 0TKeefe re-entered the apartment and demanded an explanation as to what
each was doing there. Mr. Soroushirn and Mr. Rafetti each explained their mission.
( T r 4 6 , 47)
When the manager returned to the apartment, he exclaimed "the stuff1 s
gone11. Officer 0TKeefe then demanded Mr. Soroushirn and/or Mr. Rafetti tell
him "what happened to the marijuana".

When each indicated he had no idea what

the officer was talking about, he identified himself by showing his "police identification" and gave them a "Miranda warning". (Tr 48)

•'

Officer OfKeefe then had Mr. Soroushirn and Mr. Rafetti go to Mr. RafettiTs
vehicle and remove all of the items Mr. Rafetti had placed in the vehicle and
return them to the apartment. (Tr 50) Defendant was advised by Officer 0TKeefe
that he had been in the apartment fifteen minutes earlier and that when he left,
there was marijuana in the room and that defendant was a suspect in "an official
police investigation". (Tr 59)
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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At some unspecified point, Reserve Officer McKinley returned to the
apartment and a search of the apartment was made. Officer McKinley, after
searching one of the boxes in the apartment exclaimed "I found it" and brandished
two small plastic bags which he claimed to have removed from a tape recorder in
the box. (Tr 61, 68)
McKinley, in street clothes and without identifying himself as an officer,
demanded that defendants explain to him what happened. When Mr. Soroushirn
declined to talk to him, McKinley made a "citizen's a r r e s t " and Mr. Soroushirn
was taken into custody. (Tr 78, 79)
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING EXTRA JUDICIAL STATEMENTS OFFERRED IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress all oral statements, admissions,
or confessions obtained in violation of his rights as enumerated under the V and
XIV Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Section 12
of the Utah State Constitution. (R 18) The motion was heard and denied prior to
trial. (Tr 4-16)
Officer McKinley sought to interrogate Mr, Soroushirn while at the Tawakoli
apartment.

He consealed his identity as a Reserve Officer and State Liquor and

Narcotics agent. (Tr 65) He identified himself only as a janitor-maintenance man
for the Warren house. (Tr 77) After Officer O'Keefe had reportedly given a
"Miranda Warning", Officer McKinley demanded of defendant "Well, do you want
to explain to me what happened". When Mr. Soroushirn replied tf no, I don't want
to talk to you", Officer McKinley turned to Officer Soukai and in defendant's presence
stated, "I would like to sign a complaint against him. Then we will find out the
truth". (Tr 9-10) He again asked defendant if he wanted to talk to him. Again Mr.
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Soroushirn declined. Officer McKinley then made a "citizen's arrest f r and had
Mr. Soroushirn transported to jail still believing he was arrested by a janitor. (Tr 79)
After posting bail Mr. Soroushirn returned to the Warren Apartments
to retrieve his friendTs belongings. He encountered Officer McKinley.

Still

believing the officer to be a janitor, he inquired, "Why did you do this to me
Mr

>ther?" Officer McKinley, still bent on concealing his identity, coyly replied,

"Well, if you had been truthful with me, it may not have gotten this far". (Tr 72)
The officer then launched into a full scale interrogation of the defendant without benefit of Miranda Warning or notice of his police identity. (Tr 77) As a
result of this interrogation, the officer was allowed to tell the jury that Mr.
Soroushirn (1) admitted owning the tape recorder in which the marijuana was found,
(2) denied owning the marijuana and (3) admitted putting the marijuana in the tape
recorder. (Tr 74)
Officer McKinley f s action seems calculated to coerce, confuse, deceive
and trick Mr. Soroushirn into making an incriminating statement. Mr. Soroushirn
interpreted the officer as saying he was being prosecuted because he "told a lie".
(Tr 119)
Before any statements are admissable, the state has the burden of proving
they were voluntarily given. State v. Dunkley, 85 Utah 546, 39 P. 2d 1097. The
United States Supreme Court has stated "moreover, any evidence that the accused
was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will of course, show that the
defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege". Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S.
436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
Officer McKinley ! s own testimony discloses (1) that he twice threatened to sign
a criminal complaint if defendant didnTt tell him what happened, (2) made a "citizen's
arrest" of defendant after defendant's second refusal to discuss the matter, (3)
concealed his identity as a police officer, (4) misrepresented his interest in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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case as that of a janitor, (5) implied that if defendant talked with him that charges
might not go any farther, (6) continued to press defendant for damaging information
after having been told twice before that the defendant did not desire to discuss
anything with him, (7) fastidiously avoided giving defendant any Miranda type
warnings during either interrogation under the assumption "that h e , . . w a s n ' t
obligated to, not as a citizen". (Tr 77)
McKinleyTs assertion that he need not be concerned with Miranda Warnings
because he was acting as a "citizen" exposes the contempt the prosecution displayed
for defendants right against self incrimination. McKinley, in addition to being
a Reserve Ogden Police Officer, was a State Liquor and Narcotics under cover
agent. (Tr 65) He controlled the investigation and prosecution of the case from
the outset in that (1) he made the initial search of the apartment, (2) discovered the
second bag of marijuana, (3) took charge of the apartment while waiting for the
"narcotics squad", (4) conducted a second search of the apartment and its contents,
(5) located what was believed to be the missing marijuana inside defendants tape
recorder, (6) sought to interrogate Mr. Soroushirn and (7) arrested the defendant.
Since when does one ! s constitutional rights depend on whether or not an investigating
officer claims to be acting "under cover" and as a "citizen"?
The unreliability of Officer McKinley1 s translation of the statements attributed
to Mr. Soroushirn should have been enough in and of itself to exclude the statements.
Mr. Soroushirn admittedly spoke very broken English at the time of his interrogation.
(Tr 6) He took the stand and denied making the statement as attributed to him by
the officer, (Tr 119, 120) Officer McKinley made no reports of his investigation
or of the defendants statements. The statements were never reduced to writing,
and the officer made no notes of his conversation.

He was unable to state exactly

what was said. (Tr 87, 88)
- 6 -
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The prosecution argued that Mr. Soroushirn initiated the conversation,
t

iplained of and that the damaging admissions were made after his release

from custody, and therefore his statements were not protected by Miranda. It
should be noted that the U. S. Supreme Court in Miranda, Supra stated:
"The prosecution may not use statements,.. stemming from custodial
interrogation unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safe guards
to secure the privilege against self incrimination", at 444 [emphasis
added]
It can be fairly inferred from the record that the statement complained of
ff

stemmed n directly from the earlier custodial interrogation and the threats and

misrepresentations attended thereto. There is little doubt that Officer McKinley
sought to circumvent the Miranda Warnings by deliberately directing and designing
his questioning to uncover damaging evidence against defendant in the forthcoming trial,
Furthermore all was done after the defendant had twice told him he did not wish
to discuss the incident with him and after the officer had misrepresented his
interest in the case and had given no Miranda Warning.
The U. S. Supreme Court has stated that courts should indulge every reasonabL
presumption against a waiver of any fundamental constitutional right rather than
presume acquiescence in the loss. Johnson v. Z e r b s t , 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct.
1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938) at page 1466. Even in a state court proceeding, the
effective waiver of a federal right is governed by Federal Standards. Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965). In summary,
it is submitted that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Officer
McKinley to be placed before the jury. The state offerred no substantial evidence
as to the voluntariness of the statements attributed to defendant.

On the other

hand, the record is frought with examples of coersion, misrepresentation and
trickery.
. _

The fact that there was no written record of these statements and that
„7~ .
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the officer testified from memory as to what he thought he heard a Persian speaking
broken English say several months earlier, raises further questions. The defendant's
denial of the statements when added to the already complicated factual situation
gives compelling proof that the statements should have been suppressed.
*

»

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSINGTOSUPPRESS EVIDENCE
OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress any items of evidence taken from
defendants possession at room 119, Warren Apartments on the grounds that the same
were seized in violation of his constitutional rights under the IV and XIV Amendments
of the U. S. Constitution and Article 1 Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah. The motion was denied. (Tr 16)
Officers OfKeefe and'McKinley preformed several searches. All were made
without warrants. The first search of the apartment was made at the request of the
apartment management with the apparent belief the apartment was vacant. It is not
this search wherewith the appellant takes issue.
After the first search was completed, the officers locked the apartment and
vacated the premises. When they later returned, the apartment was occupied by
Messrs. Soroushirn and Rafetti.

Possessory rights to the apartment had been

transferred to them by Mr. Tawakoli for the purpose of removing his belongings
and putting them into storage. The officers were fully advised. (Tr 46)
Despite this, Officer OfKeefe entered the apartment, ordered the return
of all boxes previously taken from the apartment and placed in the automobile and
proceeded to search all items of personalty in defendant's possession and/or under
his control. Officer McKinley searched defendant's tape recorder and after
removing its eovar discovered the contraband in question. (Tr 68)
-8-
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It is acknowledged that perhaps the apartment manager could and did
consent to the earlier search of the apartment. However, the search of the items
of personalty under the defendants control both in the apartment and in the automobile, is a different matter.

The apartment management had no claim over these

items and no right to consent to the search.

Furthermore, the officers never

requested or received the consent of Messrs. Soroushirn or Rafetti to make any
additional searches. Accordingly, the search of the tape recorder and the seizure
of its contents without a warrant and/or defendants consent was in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and defendant's
motion to suppress these items from evidence should have been granted. Map v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in refusing to suppress the extrajudicial statements
given by the accused in violation of Constitutional rights against self incrimination
and in refusing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of warrantless search of
the accused's belongings.
Respectively Submitted

William D. Marsh
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Suite 1, The Estate House
2408 Van Buren Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84403

_9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

